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THE LEFf CRITIQUE OF NORMATIVITY: 
A COMMENT 
Mark V. Tushnet* 
"In today's legal academy, the critique of normativity is associated 
with the left." The preceding sentence, which I have constructed to 
summarize the starting point of this essay, is both largely true and 
arguably incoherent.1 The incoherence occurs because describing a 
position as "the left" connotes values like egalitarianism, which are 
obviously normative. This essay examines the ways in which some 
writers associated with the left in the legal academy have tried to re-
solve the incoherence.2 The first Part shows that these writers can be 
identified with the left even in their critiques of normativity and also 
shows that they are reluctant to offer in their writings anything more 
than statements of their commitments to "the left," which in turn has 
for them a rather thin content. Although the writers offer a variety of 
policy prescriptions of a generally egalitarian sort, they are reluctant 
to say why moving in the direction of equality rather than maintaining 
the status quo or increasing inequality (perhaps to increase the amount 
of material goods available even to the worst off) is a good thing. The 
second Part offers several sociological explanations for the thinness of 
their leftist commitment. The following Part discusses some alterna-
tives to the thinness of that commitment, such as social democracy, 
pragmatism, and Roberto Unger's theory of destabilization rights. 
The conclusion suggests that the best course for critics of normativity 
• Professor of Law, Georgetown University. B.A. 1967, Harvard; J.D. 1971, M.A. 1971, 
Yale. - Ed. I would like to thank Andrew Altman and L. Michael Seidman for their helpful 
comments on this essay. 
1. In political science departments, conservatives do divide over natural law and positivism, 
but those divisions have not significantly reached the legal academy, perhaps because there are so 
few conservatives there. The tension between positivism and natural law can be glimpsed in 
Robert Bork's work, which adopts a thoroughgoing positivism, in which what a majority prefers 
is the sole evaluative standard in its treatment of judicial review and seems committed to some, 
relatively undefended, normative stance in its occasional discussion of policy issues. Compare 
ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA (1990) (discussion of judicial review) with ROB-
ERT H. BORK, TRAomoN AND MORALITY IN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW (1984) (The Frances 
Boyer Lectures on Public Policy, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research) (pol-
icy discussion). 
2. The essay is not concerned with a jurisprudential "school" called critical legal studies, but 
rather with what some writers have said. The so-called school is extremely diverse internally, 
and may not even properly be described as a jurisprudential tendency. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, 
Critical Legal Studies: A Political History, 100 YALE L.J. 1515 (1991) (describing critical legal 
studies as a political location). 
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may lie in forgoing any attempt to support their leftist inclinations 
through rational arguments of the sort to which they are, by training, 
unfortunately committed as well. 
I. THE LEFTISM OF THE CRITIQUE OF NORMATIVITY 
In April 1991, the University of Pennsylvania Law Review pub-
lished a symposium entitled "The Critique ofNormativity."3 Three of 
the authors of the principal articles - Pierre Schlag, Richard Del-
gado, and Steven Winter - are associated with the left in the legal 
academy,4 and their political sympathies are clear in the articles they 
published in the symposium. But being on the left means having some 
normative positions. So how could they offer a "critique of normativ-
ity" as such? 
The answer lies in their definition of normativity. In Pierre 
Schlag's terms, the "aim" of "normative legal thought" is "to articu-
late or develop a norm that is complete, self-sufficient, discrete, separa-
ble, trans-situational, non-contradictory, and non-paradoxical within 
its intellectual or legaljurisdiction."5 For Richard Delgado, the target 
is "grand normative theory."6 
For these authors, then, "normativity" is what I label comprehen-
sive normative rationality. They argue that the claims for comprehen-
sive normative rationality cannot be sustained. Their reasons need not 
be addressed in this essay, whose topic is not the merits of the argu-
ments deployed in the critique of normativity. Yet the articles contain 
a number of obviously normative statements, and those statements 
provide my starting point. As Margaret Jane Radin and Frank 
Michelman noted in their comment on the principal articles, the very 
statement, "We should talk more normatively,"7 which they quote 
from another of Schlag's articles, is itself a normative statement. For 
rhetorical purposes, Schlag gives the normative sentence, "[T]hey [cer-
tain normative questions] are the wrong ones," a prominent place in 
his symposium article. 8 Delgado says that we could replace normative 
3. Symposium, The Critique of Normativity, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 801 (1991). 
4. The fourth, Frederick Schauer, is a liberal in his personal politics, a fact rarely reflected in 
his scholarship. 
5. Pierre Schlag, Normativity and the Politics of Form, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 801, 839 (1991) 
(emphasis omitted). 
6. Richard Delgado, Norms and Normal Science: Toward a Critique of Normativity in Legal 
Thought, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 933, 934 (1991). 
7. Margaret J. Radin & Frank Michelman, Pragmatist and Poststructuralist Critical Legal 
Practice, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1019, 1021 (1991) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Pierre Schlag, Nor· 
motive and Nowhere to Go, 43 STAN. L. REv. 167, 171 (1990)). 
8. Schlag, supra note 5, at 805. 
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legal thought by legal thought pure and simple, "actually observing it 
and describing it .... We might begin to notice things like beggars or 
the countless other wounded that our system throws up. We might 
focus for the first time on subsistence claims, appreciate the dance be-
tween huge bureaucracies and those they serv(ic)e."9 Winter writes 
that "we are saddled by a futile and increasingly counterproductive 
·model of social order," and urges "more productive attention on fos-
tering the kinds of conditions of community that might enable a more 
meaningful normative practice."IO In an earlier critique of compre-
hensive normative rationality, Joseph Singer offered a normative 
agenda that began with these paragraphs: 
We should prevent cruelty. Right now, people are being dragged 
from their homes, in darkness, and even in broad daylight. It is some-
one's daughter, someone's son, someone's husband. They are tortured 
and raped and made to endure cruel games. Then they are killed in 
gruesome and inventive ways. 
In some instances, the American government subsidizes the people 
who commit these acts. The government reprimands the people, sternly. 
And the subsidies continue. I I 
These normative statements, unlike those associated with compre-
hensive normative rationality, are small scale. They make what have 
been called "local" claims about good and bad practices, Iz without 
attempting to offer what their authors believe will inevitably be inade-
quate - or futile - general, or abstract, or comprehensive, accounts 
of why the practices are good or bad. The problem with comprehen-
sive normative rationality, then, must be that it is comprehensive and/ 
or rational, not that it is normative. 
Arthur Leff 's famous prose poem pointed to one obvious difficulty 
with small-scale or local normativity. Leff concluded his skeptical cri-
tique of normativity: 
As things now stand, everything is up for grabs. 
Nevertheless: 
Napalming babies is bad. 
Starving the poor is wicked. 
Buying and selling each other is depraved. Those who stood up to 
and died resisting Hitler, Stalin, Amin, and Pol Pot - and General 
Custer too - have earned salvation. 
9. Delgado, supra note 6, at 959-60 (footnotes omitted). 
10. Steven Winter, Contingency and Community in Normative Practice, 139 U. PA. L. RF.v. 
963, 1001-02 (1991). 
11. Joseph W. Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. l, 
67-68 (1984) (emphasis and footnotes omitted}. 
12. For explication of the term local, see, for example, James Boyle, The Politics of Reason: 
Critical Legal Theory and Local Social Thought, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 685 (1985). 
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Those who acquiesced deserve to be damned. 
There is in the world such a thing as evil. 13 
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Leff, whose final project was the compilation of a legal dictionary, 14 
was too sophisticated to believe that the judgments he uttered were 
simple statements of brute fact about the world. 15 Consider a slight 
modification of one of Leff's examples: "Killing babies is wrong." 
Then consider the use of that statement by opponents of unrestrictive 
abortion laws. I believe that most of the proponents of the critique of 
comprehensive normative rationality would reject the claim that it fol-
lows from that statement that abortion is wrong. Why? The first line 
of response would be that fetuses are not babies in the sense that 
makes the initial statement true, and the second line would be that 
abortion is not killing in the relevant sense. Those responses might 
well be correct, but the need to make them shows that small-scale or 
local normative statements cannot stand alone. 
Similarly, those who engaged in, or at least ordered, the activity, 
did not think that they were "napalming babies"; they thought that 
they were doing something like "adopting only those military means 
necessary to preserve freedom." Delgado describes some people he 
encounters on the street as "beggars"; Charles Murray, a severe critic 
of public assistance policies associated with the Great Society,16 might 
call them "lazy," thereby using a term with different connotations and 
suggesting a different policy response to their situation. Something be-
yond merely offering a description will be needed to make it credible 
against competing descriptions, at least where the audience for the de-
scription is not already committed to the normative judgment implicit 
in it. 
How can we choose between competing descriptions? In quoting 
Leff, I omitted his final sentences: "[All together now:] Sez who? 
God help us."17 Religion provides one ground for choice, though not 
one easily called rational, nor, of course, one that everyone would ac-
cept. The project of comprehensive normative rationality provides 
other grounds. Perhaps the main line of Enlightenment rationality 
was to develop relatively abstract criteria that would account for 
13. Arthur A. Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1229, 1249. 
14. For what he had completed at the time of his death, see Arthur Allen Leff, The Leff 
Dictionary of Law: A Fragment, 94 YALE L.J. 1855 (1985). 
15. The following argument is drawn from MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE 119 
(1988). 
16. See, e.g., CHARLES MURRAY, Los!NG GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY, 1950-1980 
(1984). 
17. Leff, supra note 13, at 1249. For another celebrated invocation of the deity, see RO-
BERTO M. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND PoLmcs 295 (1975). 
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describing an act as "torture." It then attempted to justify its criteria 
against competitors that accounted for a different description by show-
ing that its criteria were more rationally defensible than those alterna-
tives. The rational defense of descriptive criteria would then produce 
the comprehensive normative framework against which a wide range 
of practices could be evaluated. 
Another ground for choosing among descriptions is an account of 
human nature, as in some versions of natural law theory. The heads of 
the armed forces might not describe what they ordered as "napalming 
babies." But, an outsider would note, they have particular material 
and perhaps psychological interests in offering a different description. 
If their thought processes were purified of these contaminating inter-
ests, we might discover that all who thought about the problem in a 
detached, neutral way would reach the same conclusion. Winter's in-
terest in the conditions of community might demonstrate his commit-
ment to this part of the project; those conditions might identify 
"purified" communities. But the overall critique of comprehensive 
normative rationality cannot easily accommodate the idea of purifica-
tion. That idea rests on the assumption that there are detached and 
neutral ways of examining normative questions, an assumption con-
trary to Schlag's and Delgado's views that everyone is always already 
situated, with material and psychological interests that constitute 
them. 
The critics of comprehensive normative rationality, of course, 
know the moves I have just made.18 Somehow, they must reconcile 
their commitment to small-scale or local normative judgments with 
their critique of comprehensive normative rationality. Two paths are 
obviously open: to reject rationality; or to reject comprehensiveness 
while retaining a commitment to some broader perspective than that 
of the completely localized time and place. 
Radin and Michelman call the rejection of rationality nominalist 
intuitionism or radical particularism. Citing Robert Heinlein, they 
write, "What can someone in this stance give as a reason for her deci-
sion other than she just looked out at the world at the given moment 
and grokked the answer?"19 They are skeptical that this stance "can 
accomplish much good for human beings."2° Critics of comprehen-
sive normative rationality might respond, however, that Radin and 
Michelman overlook the fact that reason giving occurs by "looking 
18. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Moves, 139 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 1071 (1991). 
19. Radin & Michelman, supra note 7, at 1046. 
20. Id. 
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and grokking" in particular circumstances, and the audience for the 
account may be receptive to or moved to do some good, as the particu-
larist defines it, by the radical particularist's flat judgment. Radical 
particularism, that is, might be a strategic stance adopted for good 
pragmatic reasons.21 The other obvious path is to defend the small-
scale normative judgments by locating them, not in the timeless and 
spaceless world of comprehensive normative rationality, but in a his-
toricized world. The descriptions and implicit judgments would then 
be localized to some degree, but not so localized as to be radically 
particularist. 
II. A SOCIOLOGY OF THE CRITIQUE'S THIN NORMATIVITY 
This Part sketches some aspects of the social field in which the 
critique of comprehensive normative rationality is located; the next 
Part locates the critique in an intellectual field. I adopt this structure 
because, if normative discourse is to be displaced entirely, it will be 
replaced by something like sociology. 22 The aim in this Part, then, is 
to account for the thinness of the normativity produced in the critique 
of comprehensive normative rationality. 
One aspect of the social field is social-psychological. To some ex-
tent, the critique of comprehensive normative rationality is a genera-
tional and psychological response to the self-presentations of 
proponents of comprehensive normative rationality. In Robin West's 
useful term, those proponents present themselves as authoritarian. 23 
So, for example, in the course of defending the project of comprehen-
21. I should note that I am extremely sympathetic to the pragmatic defense of radical partic-
ularism, because I believe that it has worked well to destabilize confidence in comprehensive 
normative rationality, and that destabilizing that confidence is a good thing under the present 
circumstances where social engineers of the right, center, and left have done so badly. My con-
cern in this essay is with what I believe to be an impossible philosophical defense of the critique 
of comprehensive normative rationality, a defense that, because it must fail, may reduce the 
power of radical particularist presentations whose authors do not take it upon themselves to 
provide large-scale philosophical defenses. But maybe I'm wrong. 
22. Schlag has critiqued law-and-society studies as normative: 
In law and society work, conceptual categories identifying institutions and institutional 
processes are often borrowed from the legal culture or the wider culture to describe or 
explain human behavior without the slightest question ever being raised as to their identity, 
integrity, or constitution. In both history and law and society work, the research agendas 
are guided significantly by the extent to which empirical evidence is available. In tum, this 
data-dependence results in an (unavoidable) privileging of the conceptual categories, the 
information retrieval systems, of the very social and cultural systems being studied. 
Schlag, supra note 5, at 813. A lot of work is done by the "often" in this critique. In my view 
Schlag severely underestimates the sophistication of the best law-and-society work. For a contri-
bution to, and discussion of, such work, see David M. Trubek & John Esser, "Critical Empiri-
cism" in American Legal Studies: Paradox, Program or Pandora's Box?, 14 LAW & Soc. INQ. 3 
(1989). 
23. Robin L. West, The Authoritarian Impulse in Constitutional Law, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
531 (1988). 
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sive normative rationality, Owen Fiss adopts the view that "in legal 
interpretation there is only one school and attendance is 
mandatory."24 More than the specific authoritarian content, there is 
the tone in which the project is laid out: self-assured, confident that, 
although some problems in reaching the goal remain, reasonable peo-
ple surely must agree that the project is the only one truly worth pur-
suing. The attraction of rebellion against this self-confidence is 
evident, particularly when we consider the natural disciplinary advan-
tages that a new generation has in defining its positions against those 
of its immediate predecessor. 
Further, as West has argued, the authoritarian stance in constitu-
tional law, the field with which I am most familiar, may have made 
sense for liberals or leftists when there was some hope that the 
Supreme Court might adopt liberal positions. 25 In the telling subtitle 
of an article by Susan Estrich and Kathleen Sullivan, some degree of 
authoritarianism may be appropriate when one is "Writing for an Au-
dience of One."26 But what can liberal scholars do when the audience 
- defined in authoritarian terms as the Supreme Court - is none?27 
One possibility is to redefine the audience as one's students. Yet 
that redefinition raises problems related to authoritarianism, whose so-
24. Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REv. 739, 746 (1982). Con-
trast this with the pluralist vision of Robert Cover, who emphasized that law is produced- and 
therefore interpreted - everywhere in society. Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 
Term - Foreword: Nomos and Na"ative, 97 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1983). 
25. I should note, however, that I believe that West's attempt to locate constitutional author-
ity in Congress, see Robin West, Progressive and Conservative Constitutionalism, 88 MICH. L. 
REV. 641, 717-21 (1990), or, in later work, in a heroic figure like Vaclav Havel, see Robin West, 
The Supreme Court, 1989 Term -Foreword: Taking Freedom Seriously, 104 HARV. L. REv. 43, 
63-79 (1990), reproduces the authoritarianism she criticizes. I believe that only a thorough-going 
anarchism or abandonment of any residual normativity will avoid the difficulty. 
26. Susan R. Estrich & Kathleen M. Sullivan, Abortion Politics: Writing for an Audience of 
One, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 119 (1989). The article describes the rhetorical strategies available to 
supporters of the right to choose in arguing that the Supreme Court, as constituted at that time, 
ought to find restrictive abortion laws unconstitutional. The audience of one was Justice 
O'Connor, then seen as the "swing vote." 
27. They can of course continue to rewrite opinions that the Court has rejected, in the appar-
ent hope that a better-reasoned doctrinal article will persuade the Court to adhere to the rejected 
result When the rejected result is Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) - redefended on equality 
grounds, see, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Neutrality in Constitutional Law (With Special Reference to 
Pornography, Abortion, and Su"ogacy), 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1992) - or DeShaney v. Winne-
bago County Dept. of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989)- redefended on Thirteenth Amendment 
grounds, see, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar & David Widawsky, Child Abuse as Slavery: A Thirteenth 
Amendment Response to DeShaney, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1992)-the bizarre nature of the 
enterprise is apparent. The genre developed, I believe, to defend controversial decisions, to 
which the Court remained committed, against academic criticism. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Shel-
ley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 473 (1962). Its transformation 
to offer alternative rationales for results the Court clearly will not reach signifies the further 
detachment of legal scholarship from the practice of Jaw, in the doctrinal domain where the 
connections between scholarship and practice would seem closest. See J.M. Balkin, What Is a 
Postmodern Constitutionalism?, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1966, 1985-86 (1992). 
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lution may lie in a thin classroom commitment to the left. We attempt 
to avoid the authority implicit in our position in front of the class by 
refusing to offer explicit or detailed defenses of the political positions 
we nonetheless assert. A recent article by Joseph Singer indicates why 
the redefinition may incline legal academics on the left to a thin 
normativity.28 Singer describes his inability to make his students ap-
preciate the force of the argument that workers and communities have 
an interest, which could be protected under existing law, in the contin-
ued operation of major industrial facilities around which communities 
have been constructed.29 Although the students could reproduce the 
arguments, Singer found that they did not experience the arguments as 
"real" or credible: They were simply mouthing the lines without un-
derstanding them. Singer then describes how he developed a hypo-
th~tical, drawing on law school experiences, that captured the 
important analytic features of the plant-relocation problem. When 
students worked with this hypothetical, Singer reports, they exper-
ienced the "vulnerability and broken trust" at work in the plant-relo-
cation problem. 30 The hypothetical "created a sense of connection 
between the students and the workers."31 
As nearly all published accounts of teaching experiences do, this 
one describes a pedagogic success, as seen by the author-teacher. And, 
like most such accounts, its author's perspective affects the lessons we 
are invited to draw. In summarizing the experience, Singer deperson-
alizes the subject: "The story forced the students to imagine what it 
would be like to be vulnerable to the whims of an institution which . 
had a significant power to determine the shapes of their lives."32 Con-
sider the implications of a personalized subject: "In using the story, I 
forced the students to imagine what it would be like to be vulnerable 
to the whims of an institution which had a significant power to deter-
mine the shapes of their lives." The active voice brings out the 
teacher's authority over the class and thereby begins to undermine 
Singer's suggestion that students need to "imagine" being vulnerable 
to the whims of an institution - or, in the classroom, a person - who 
28. Joseph W. Singer, Persuasion, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2442 (1989). 
29. For Singer's presentation of the argument to a wider audience, see Joseph W. Singer, The 
Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REv. 611 (1988). 
30. Singer, supra note 28, at 2455. 
31. Id. at 2453. 
32. Id. at 2455; see also id. at 2454 ("The story encouraged the students to see the world from 
someone else's perspective."), 2457 ("The example forced them to realize that self-reliance is not 
the only norm that drives the market. The story brought the students in touch with the complex· 
ity of their moral intuitions."). 
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has power over them. 33 
Uncomfortable with exercising authority, however, Singer defers 
the issue of authority from himself in the classroom to an almost de-
personalized "law school faculty."34 As Singer makes clear, he be-
lieved that the plant-closing story was "dismal" and morally 
outrageous, and ought to have been legally problematic. 35 Again, un-
comfortable with making the moral argument directly, Singer retreats 
to a professionalist defense of his pedagogy. Singer argues that his 
students "identified, consciously or unconsciously, with the corporate 
managers who desired the freedom to manage what they saw as their 
own business,"36 and that he had the modest aim of improving their 
argumentative skills by demonstrating that, no matter what position 
one takes, one can make better arguments if one truly appreciates the 
moral force of the arguments on the other side. 37 
Singer's example richly illustrates some sources of the thinness of 
the left's normative commitment. As a person of the left, Singer op-
poses the sort of unjustified hierarchy he finds in the management-
community dynamic. But for him to say exactly that to his students 
would be to exercise hierarchical authority. One might even say that 
Singer unconsciously identifies with the managers in desiring the free-
dom to manage what he sees as "his" classroom, and equally uncon-
sciously is dismayed by that identification. He could overcome that 
dismay by having available a comprehensive account of authority, if 
there is one, that would distinguish between the legitimate authority 
he exercises in the classroom and the illegitimate authority managers 
exercise. By offering a merely professionalist defense of his pedagogy, 
his identification with "workers" and their communities is left 
sentimentalized. 
So far I have argued that the left's position in the legal academy, 
first as a new generation and second as classroom teachers, makes 
some of its members uncomfortable with authority and leads them to a 
thin expression of their leftist values. A third reason for that thinness 
33. I suspect as well that Singer underestimates the sophistication of students in "scoping 
him out." I would guess that in prior years Singer's presentation suggested to students that he 
wanted them to be able to produce the competing arguments, which they did, in compliance with 
what they perceived to be his desires. The new version may well have indicated to students that 
Singer wanted them not only to produce the arguments but to internalize them and demonstrate 
empathy with the workers. So, again in compliance with what they perceived to be his desires, 
the students acted as if they had internalized the arguments and empathized with the workers. 
34. The faculty is not entirely depersonalized, because at some level Singer undoubtedly ap-
preciated that he was part of the faculty whose actions he hypothesizes. 
35. See Singer, supra note 28, at 2445. 
36. Id. at 2457. 
37. See id. at 2447-48. 
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arises from the way in which the left in the legal academy has been 
constituted and is being reconstituted. Demographic changes in the 
legal professoriate - the expansion of the numbers of feminist and 
minority scholars - have changed the composition of the left. The 
distinctive legal theories that these scholars have produced place com-
prehensive normative accounts under severe pressure. Yet, I argue 
next, as feminist and minority jurisprudence has developed, it has 
threatened to produce a radically particularist account of value incon-
sistent with the leftist commitments of most of its producers and of 
most of the white male scholars sympathetic both to the demographic 
changes and to the new jurisprudence. The tension between the cri-
tique of comprehensive normative rationality associated with feminist 
and minority jurisprudence, and leftist commitments, has led, at this 
point at least, to left scholars' willingness to indicate only their thin 
leftist commitments. 
The conventional account of recent developments in jurisprudence 
begins by arguing that feminist jurisprudence has insisted that women 
and minorities contribute a distinctive voice to legal theory.38 Like all 
conventional accounts, this oversimplifies but retains a core truth. 
Feminist and minority jurisprudence recharacterized the prevailing 
mode of jurisprudence, with its comprehensive normative discourse, as 
distinctively male. 39 In doing so, it denied that jurisprudence's claim 
to comprehensive scope. It then filled in the space thereby opened 
with what it argued were the distinctive positions of women and peo-
ple of color. At that point, however, feminist and minority jurispru-
dence faced a number of problems. First, having characterized the 
prevailing mode of jurisprudence as male, it ran the risk of essentializ-
ing the voices of women and minorities: Just as, and to the extent 
that, the prevailing jurisprudence was essentially male, so the alterna-
tive jurisprudence was essentially female. But, having emphasized the 
importance of interjecting a new voice into jurisprudence, feminist and 
minority jurisprudence found it difficult to sustain the essentialist 
claim that there was only one new voice. The demographic changes I 
have mentioned made this all too clear: The new voices came from 
women taken as a gender group, white women, women of color, men 
of color.40 
38. See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829 (1990). 
39. In early work in feminist jurisprudence, the prevailing mode was described as male, 
rather than as male and white, because adding the racial description would have problematized 
the voice of the (mainly white) feminist authors themselves. 
40. See Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 
581 (1990). 
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Second, the normative status of the substantive claims made in 
feminist and minority jurisprudence, taken in conjunction with essen-
tialist arguments, was unclear.41 If the prevailing jurisprudence was 
flawed because it embodied a distinctively male perspective, why 
should that trouble the men who produced that jurisprudence? Any 
satisfactory answer would have to appeal to some feature of normative 
discourse that transcended gender and racial difference. Yet that 
threatened to reinscribe the comprehensive normative discourse 
against which feminist and minority jurisprudence set itself. 
Third, feminist and minority jurisprudence took a stand against 
the essentialism of comprehensive normative discourse. But its anties-
sentialism raised another difficulty. If normative views had to be in-
dexed - to gender, race, and the like - why should they not be 
indexed to each person in her or his particularity? Antiessentialism 
meant that no one could rightly claim the universal validity of any 
normative proposition without simultaneously noting that the claim of 
universal truth was made by a man, a white woman, a woman of color, 
and the like. Taken a step further, it might have meant that when 
such claims were made, one would also have to note that they were 
made by a white woman teaching at an elite law school, or by a white 
man teaching at a nonelite law school, and so on down the line to a 
radically particularized index: claims made by this particular person 
who had this particular, and unique, history. 
The descent into radical particularism had two facets. One was 
philosophical. Particularism in normative discourse seemed solipsis-
tic, and the defects of solipsism there are well known. 42 The other was 
political. Particularism to that degree was individualistic, and individ-
ualism was a position associated with the right rather than the left. 
Retreating from comprehensive normative discourse while contin-
uing to assert the claims of a diminished leftist commitment was at 
least a way station to a solution to these difficulties. The slide to com-
plete individualism could be halted by noting that, in every particular 
historical situation, one could identify groups whose members did as a 
matter of brute fact tend to hold distinctive views. Those groups were 
not defined by any essential characteristics such as race or gender, 
though; they were instead socially constructed, and at any particular 
time there were only a limited number of them. 
Treating voices as socially constructed, however, did not solve the 
41. This argument has repeatedly been pressed on me by L. Michael Seidman. I have come 
to think that it makes sense in, but only in, the context discussed in the text. 
42. Here antiessentialism converged with the radical particularism discussed above, supra 
text accompanying notes 19-21. 
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underlying normative difficulty. It eliminated the extreme possibility 
that the society shared a single normative view and the competing ex-
treme possibility that there were as many normative views as there 
were people. It did not explain why one or a few of those normative 
views demanded special attention. The solution lay in making inter-
sectionality the analytic key.43 Intersectionality describes those who 
share a group of socially constructed characteristics - women of 
color, African-American gay men, and the like. At the programmatic 
level, the scholarship of intersectionality deals with groups with char-
acteristics each of which has been historically subject to subordination. 
But, at the analytic level, the scholarship suggests that, despite the 
existence of socially constructed groups whose members differ in their 
normative views, there are intersections where some agreement can be 
found. Then, the implicit normative claim becomes, careful attention 
to the intersections at which everyone can be found - "the human 
condition" - will disclose some common normative ground. Femi-
nist and minority jurisprudence began as a critique of the prevailing 
mode of jurisprudence, and could not (without abandoning its critical 
impulse) claim that this intersection was sufficiently large to accom-
modate the comprehensive normative claims made in that mode. The 
result, again, was a thin leftist discourse. 
III. ALTERNATIVES TO THE CRITIQUE'S THIN NORMATIVITY 
I find two possible responses to the thin normativity of the leftist 
critique of comprehensive normative rationality particularly interest-
ing, and this Part examines some variants of these responses. 44 The 
first response accepts the critique of comprehensive normative ration-
ality but argues that that critique does not undermine anything of in-
terest in the claims of traditional liberalism. The second response 
might be seen as contending that the intersections that the critique 
relies on to halt the slide to particularism actually support more com-
prehensive programs than the thin one I have associated with the 
critique. 
John Rawls' recent work illustrates the first response. Some critics 
43. See Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black 
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics, 1989 
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139; Judith Scales-Trent, Black Women and the Constitution: Finding Our 
Place, Asserting Our Rights, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 9 (1989). 
44. To avoid certain obvious difficulties, I have come to describe the kind of argument devel-
oped in this Part as "informal political theory." Mark Tushnet, Rights: An Essay in Informal 
Political Theory, 17 POL. & SOCY. 403 (1989). I am interested, that is, in the ways arguments are 
actually used in particular discourses, not in whether those arguments are "well-founded" in 
some ultimate sense. 
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of Rawls' A Theory of Justice, 45 many associated with a communitar-
ian strand of leftist thought, 46 argued that his work rested on unsup~ 
portable assumptions about personality. They read him as developing 
a theory that required real people to "bracket" aspects of their per-
sonhood that constituted them as people and argued that no theory 
with such severe constraints could be acceptable. Rawls responded by 
claiming that his critics had misread him. His theory, he argued, was 
"political, not metaphysical. "47 For him, a theory of justice dealt with 
the restricted domain of the fundamental institutions of political soci-
ety. It was designed to specify those relatively few institutions that 
had proven essential to preserving social peace in a world of ineradica-
ble differences about the Good. Liberal theory would succeed, on 
Rawls' more recent view, if it described institutional arrangements 
that promised to avoid the evils of social disorder and widespread mis-
ery historically associated with such differences.48 
When those who have produced versions of the left critique of 
normativity have addressed Rawls, they have insisted that there is no 
change between the comprehensive claims they attribute to his early 
work and the more restricted claims he is quite clearly making at pres-
ent. James Boyle, for example, writes that he is "completely uncon-
vinced" by a paraphrase of Rawls' position because 
[n]eecling "only" to be able to postulate universal qualities that we 
should attribute to personhood within a theory of justice, seems to me 
just as demanding as the task of postulating a universal subject, tout seul . 
. . . It is no easier to build a small perpetual motion machine than a large 
one.49 
45. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). 
46. For a discussion, see Amy Gutmann, Communitarian Critics of Liberalism, 14 PHIL. & 
PUB. AFF. 308 (1985). 
47. John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical. 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 223 
(1985). For the most important later development, see John Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping 
Consensus, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1987). I am not interested here in the hermeneutic 
question of whether the critics misread A Theory of Justice. Given how widespread the commu-
nitarian critique became, it seems clear that the book at least lent itself to the reading on which 
the critique rested. 
48. This restriction of justice's domain might have been apparent from the outset. Rawls had 
been quite explicit in A Theory of Justice that his theory was compatible with economic institu-
tions ranging at least from those of modem social democracy, in which collective authority is 
widely deployed to regulate excesses, including wide disparities in wealth resulting from individ-
ual control of the means of production, to those of relatively laissez faire capitalism. See, e.g., 
RAWLS, supra note 45, at 271-74. 
49. James Boyle, Is Subjectivity Possible? The Post-Modem Subject in Legal Theory, 62 U. 
CoLO. L. REv. 489, 507-08 n.45 (1991). I should note that I find the dismissive tone disturbing 
in a work by a serious scholar like Boyle. Such a tone, which I have sometimes adopted, might 
be defended on strategic grounds as a way of suggesting to readers that someone who they might 
initially think ought to be taken seriously actually need not be. Boyle's presentation does not 
seem to me designed for that purpose. 
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While Boyle's criticism is sound when directed at the paraphrase, it 
does not deal with Rawls' position. 
This dismissal might at first seem odd, because the thinness of 
Rawls' recent claims converges with the thinness of the critique of 
comprehensive normative rationality. Yet the dismissal might still be 
justified, depending on how Rawls' recent work is taken in the overall 
community of discourse about comprehensive normative rationality. 
It might be read to establish that normative rationality yields impor-
tant results in a particular domain and to suggest that normative ra-
tionality could produce similarly important results in any other 
domain. For example, while Rawls' work might not have any implica-
tions for selection among modes of economic organization, it might 
suggest that normative rationality might produce a "theory of eco-
nomic order" to occupy that domain in the way that Rawls' theory of 
justice occupies the political domain. Then, as normative rationality 
moved from one domain to the next, it would reconstitute itself as 
comprehensive. In short, Rawls' recent work, while explicitly re-
stricted in its claims, might threaten a resurgence of comprehensive 
normative rationality. The leftist critique of comprehensive normative 
rationality could claim Rawls as an ally, but perhaps, in the particular 
intellectual and social circumstances of the present era where leftism is 
threatened with being swallowed by moderate liberalism, its refusal to 
do so is understandable. 
Rawls may have been rejected as an ally, but not the modem 
pragmatists50 who similarly scale down the claims of normative ra-
tionality - indeed, I believe, almost to the vanishing point. Margaret 
Jane Radin and Frank Michelman have explicitly addressed the leftist 
critique of normativity and, while finding "much that is compelling," 
defended the pragmatic altemative.51 For them, "[t]he pragmatist 
moment in critical practice is ... empirical, epidemiological, and local. 
It notices characteristic kinds of errors or biases that recur when tar-
get discourses are deployed by nonideal - incompletely committed 
and assiduous - practitioners caught in specific cultural environ-
ments. "52 Radin and Michelman illustrate the pragmatic mode in sug-
gesting that proponents of "instrumentalist economics" typically 
"suppress certain kinds of ... obstreperous values," "ignor[e] costs, 
like disruption of community, that power-wielders ... cannot handle 
according to rule," and "seem either not to notice or not to care that 
SO. See William G. Weaver, Note, Richard Rorty and the Radical Left, 78 VA. L. REV. 729 
(1992). 
SL Radin & Michelman, supra note 7, at 1020. 
S2. Id. at 1031. 
August 1992] The Left Critique of Normativity 2339 
the 'political' processes to which they buck the obstreperous value is-
sues ... may very possibly never seriously consider these issues."53 
They further point out that the pragmatic mode has its own character-
istic flaws: "[r]adical particularism,"54 "taking the status quo for 
granted,"55 and •ccomplacent or aggressive conventionalism or tradi-
tionality."56 A pragmatist might, for example, overlook the back-
ground "fact that hierarchies of race and sex remain cruelly 
entrenched ... in American life."57 "Only by constant attentiveness 
to the commonplace," they conclude, "can pragmatist critical practice 
keep faith with its postmodernist commitments to suspect facile con-
sensus and pursue epistemic openness."58 
Perhaps the first thing to note about Radin and Michelman's argu-
ment is its tone. Just as proponents of comprehensive normative ra-
tionality embody their intellectual positions by presenting themselves 
as self-assured, Radin and Michelman embody pragmatism in their 
tentativeness and in their carefully qualified defense of pragmatic criti-
cal practice. Further, the smaller-scale claims that pragmatists make 
about normativity are entirely consistent with the leftist critique of 
comprehensive normative rationality. And, of course, their own leftist 
commitments are evidenced by the examples of injustice they offer. 
Yet Radin and Michelman's pragmatism cannot displace the 
claims of comprehensive normative rationality. In his pragmatic 
mode, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote of the First Amendment's 
free speech guarantee, "It is an experiment, as all life is an experi-
ment."59 But because the scope of the experiment - "all life," or, in 
the present context, the social order - is so broad, pragmatists can 
supply little assistance in deciding whether to undertake the next vari-
ant on the experiment. Consider, for example, Reaganism/Thatcher-
ism as an experiment. When those programs are proposed, what can a 
pragmatist tell us? "Maybe they'll work, maybe they won't"? This 
seems unhelpful. 60 
53. Id. at 1034-35. 
54. Id. at 1046. 
55. Id. at 1047. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 1048. 
58. Id. 
59. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
60. The difficulty is obviously exacerbated when we are considering developments on a na-
tional or other system-wide level. That is a pragmatic reason for preferring localized decisions: 
errors have a smaller scope and perhaps can be corrected more easily. See New State Ice Co. v. 
Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (defending federalism as providing 
states as "laborator[ies]" for "novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of 
the country"). 
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Some pragmatists might respond that Reaganism/Thatcherism 
were flawed precisely because they were experiments on a grand scale. 
Pragmatists, that is, might be systematically inclined to incremental 
changes in the social order. Having ordinary levels of risk aversion, 
they might note that errors are inevitable and that mistakes made in 
taking small steps can be corrected more readily than mistakes made 
in taking large ones. Incrementalism, though, no matter what its 
other attractions, cannot be associated with the political agenda of 
pragmatism. Sometimes, large steps work better than small ones: 
compare the successful prompt desegregation of the U.S. armed forces 
under President Harry Truman with the painful and largely unsuc-
cessful effoi;t to desegregate the public schools gradually after Brown v. 
Board of Education. 61 And, of course, people are risk averse to vary-
ing degrees, in part depending on how badly off they are under the 
status quo. 
Radin and Michelman argue that pragmatists can alert us to the 
characteristic errors made by policy promoters, including the error by 
some policymakers of believing that incremental changes are likely to 
work better than large ones. My discussion of pragmatism and incre-
mentalism draws attention to a more fundamental difficulty. Even 
pragmatists will disagree about what count as characteristic errors. 
Leftist pragmatists like Radin and Michelman will identify one set of 
errors that they contend are characteristic of the present era, and con-
servative pragmatists like Richard Posner will identify another set. 62 
Radin and Michelman hint at this difficulty when they distinguish be-
tween background and foreground. "Pragmatists," they say, "do rec-
ognize that most of the background must be taken as given in order for 
the foreground to present itself for work. Yet it is we who partition 
the world's features into foreground and background .... " 63 
The problem goes deeper than that. Radin and Michelman's for-
mulation presupposes that the world has features that we then parti-
tion. But, as I argued above, 64 often what is at stake is how to describe 
the world's features. With the world described in one way, we will see 
one set of characteristic errors, but with another description we will 
see another. For example, if a traditional conservative describes the 
modern world as the product of Enlightenment rationality, perhaps 
the characteristic errors would be overestimating the human capacity 
61. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
62. For Posner, see RICHARD POSNER, PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 455·67 (1990). 
63. Radin & Michelman, supra note 7, at 1048. 
64. See supra text accompanying notes 16·18. 
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to deploy reason in the service of human goals. 65 But if a neo-con-
servative describes it as the product of natural processes of social 
evolution and "natural" selection, the characteristic errors might lie in 
underestimating the human capacity to deploy reason in the service of 
human goals. 
These examples suggest another difficulty with Radin and 
Michelman's pragmatism. They point out that pragmatists examine 
"the tendency of . . . discourse, in its cultural setting . . . "66 Again, 
however, discourses do not have cultural settings in the way this state-
ment suggests; rather, the very act of examining them places them in 
cultural settings. How widely one describes the cultural setting - the 
United States in the Reagan-Bush era, the industrialized economic 
powers in the 1990s, or the post-Enlightenment West-will strongly 
incline one to select different sorts of characteristic errors: from 
"overestimating the reasonableness of market processes as a mode of 
social organization" to "overestimating the power of reason itself." 
How can these pitfalls be avoided? The program of comprehensive 
normative rationality is a promising solution. That is, by pursuing the 
ambitions of comprehensive normative rationality, we might end up 
identifying the "right" way to describe the world's features and "its" 
culture. I am not entirely convinced that pragmatism really helps us 
to think about the problems of social order that present themselves on 
the low level of daily life, except by alleviating anxiety that we find 
ourselves forced to choose without much confidence that we know 
what we are doing. Even if pragmatism helps, however, it seems likely 
that a satisfactory philosophical agenda will have to supplement prag-
matism with comprehensive normative rationality. 
Interest in intersectionality may also lead back to the project of 
comprehensive normative rationality. In some traditional versions, in-
deed, that project grew out of precisely such an interest. What, after 
all, lies at the intersection of all our lives but "human nature as such"? 
In the Enlightenment vision of human nature, what constituted us as 
humans was our universal capacity for reason. Proponents of compre-
hensive normative rationality described themselves, accurately, as "the 
party of humanity." 
For many years mainstream social-democratic parties sought to 
achieve the project of the party of humanity. Reason applied to 
human affairs indicated what, in particular historical circumstances, 
were worthwhile reformist efforts to alleviate the misery social demo-
65. For a version of this critique of modernity, see MAX HORKHEIMER & THEODOR W. 
ADORNO, DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT (John Comming trans., 1972). 
66. Radin & Michelman, supra note 7, at 1031 (emphasis added). 
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crats saw associated with the irrationality of traditionalism on the one 
side and capitalism on the other. Largely, I believe, because the social 
democratic tradition has been notoriously weak (and, when not weak, 
subject to serious red-baiting) in the United States, leftist legal aca-
demics have not seen social democracy as a viable project. Lacking 
connection to social democratic parties, they have seen "reforms" 
floating free, and instead of finding such proposals inadequate because 
they were unsystematic, they have chosen to revel in the disconnected 
variety of reformist proposals. Again the language of pragmatism and 
experimentation helps here, but again it leads to only a thin and 
largely sentimental connection to interests ordinarily associated with 
the left.67 
I believe that Roberto Unger's work can be interpreted in the 
framework developed here as relying on an alternative to the capacity 
for reason as the human characteristic that lies at the intersection of 
all human life. 68 On this interpretation, the core human capacity is 
the ability to transcend all contexts, to choose and rechoose our forms 
of life. Unger, defending what he calls empowered democracy,69 offers 
his "destabilization rights" as the institutional embodiment of this ca-
pacity. 70 These rights, modeled on the rights used in U.S. constitu-
tional law to restructure major bureaucracies like prisons and public 
assistance systems, "protect the citizen's interest in breaking open the 
large-scale social organizations ... [that] sustain insulated hierarchies 
of power and advantage."71 
William Galston and Cass Sunstein challenge Unger's vision of 
human nature from perspectives that give the capacity for reason a 
larger place. Examining their criticisms may indicate how even those 
like me who find Unger's vision invigorating might pursue the project 
of comprehensive normative rationality. For Galston, Unger's desire 
to "open hierarchies up to the possibility of scrutiny and revision" 
ignores the idea that "[s]ome hierarchies are both rationally justifiable 
and conducive to individual self-assertion .... "and that "some revi-
sion-resisting contexts actually liberate us."72 Galston adds that "the 
67. A good example, I believe, is Singer, supra note 28. 
68. I have phrased this statement carefully, to avoid making claims that would introduce 
exegetical controversy about whether my reading of Unger is "correct," faithful to his intentions, 
and the like. 
69. ROBERTO M. UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY: ANTI-NECESSITARIAN SOCIAL THEORY IN 
THE SERVICE OF RADICAL DEMOCRACY 27 (1987). 
70. See id. at 530-35. 
71. Id. at 530. 
72. William A. Galston, False Universality: Infinite Personality and Finite Existence in Un-
ger's Politics, 81 Nw. U. L. REV. 751, 761, 762 (1987). 
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structural context of political life - the 'constitution' - .... [aims] 
to locate the appropriate mean between rigidity and anarchy."73 
Sunstein gives more detail to the constitutionalist challenge to Un-
ger. Constitutions, to Sunstein, are forms of "precommitment," which 
cannot be effective if they are routinely open to destabilization: 
Precommitment cannot work if any participant can renege as she 
pleases, by invoking her destabilization rights.74 But, according to 
Sunstein, precommitments can facilitate democracy by temporarily 
taking off· the table issues that might otherwise occupy attention so 
that different issues, arguably more important but sometimes tending 
to be overlooked, can be addressed through democratic processes. 
Consider, for example, that a social democratic state might be able 
more readily to address the questions raised by concentration of power 
in the economic sphere if issues of representation were taken to be 
settled for the moment. Those who benefit from the rigidified hierar-
chies of the economic order could invoke their right to destabilize the 
system of representation, and thereby perpetuate their economic 
power.75 
The constitutionalism that Galston and Sunstein defend is, I be-
lieve, clearly preferable to anarchy or even a political order in which 
the threat that disorder will materialize is ever-present. 76 It is not, 
however, inconsistent with what I take Unger's project to be. Con-
sider first Galston's examples of "revision-resisting contexts [that] ac-
tually liberate us" -baroque harmony, the sonnet, and the blues.77 I 
believe that these contexts liberate us precisely to the degree that we 
know that we can choose to operate within them or outside them: In a 
world where the only musical form is baroque harmony or the only 
poetic form the sonnet, musicians and poets are not liberated by con-
forming to the only form they are allowed to use.78 Similarly, when 
we precommit ourselves to particular constitutional forms, action 
within those forms has value precisely because we chose to use them 
and - at the moment of choice - could have chosen otherwise. 
73. Id. at 762. 
74. Cass R. Sunstein, Routine and Revolution, 81 Nw. U. L. REv. 869, 889-92 (1987); see 
also Galston, supra note 72, at 762 ("the structure itself cannot be challenged - at least not in 
the same way"). 
75. See Sunstein, supra note 74, at 887 (referring to "the power of self-interested private 
actors"). In doctrinal terms, this is the problem raised by the state action doctrine in constitu-
tional law. See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW 1660-61 (2d ed. 1991). 
76. Whether constitutionalism in the United States avoids this latter threat is, I believe, a 
separate question, to which I find the answer quite unclear. 
77. Galston, supra note 72, at 762. 
78. This is true even if they perform within that form at a higher level than other musicians 
or poets. 
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Galston offers another example: "In social relations, such institu-
tions as indissoluble marriage may promote intimacy and personal 
growth .... " 79 I find this puzzling but suggestive. Of course, when 
spouses decide not to dissolve their marriage, and in that sense treat it 
as indissoluble, they may find new opportunities for intimacy and per-
sonal growth, as they struggle with the tensions that raised (momenta-
rily) the possibility of dissolving the marriage.80 But those 
opportunities open up precisely because the spouses know that they 
could dissolve the marriage. Nor, I think, is the case substantially 
different if social institutions provide no formal escape from the mar-
riage. The risk of exit, either physical or emotional, is always present, 
and the opportunities for intimacy and growth arise when spouses 
confront that risk. st 
The analogy in constitutionalism should be apparent. Our com-
mitments to constitutional forms are valuable because, and to the ex-
tent that, we know that we have made and continue to make them. 
Destabilization rights give us that knowledge. Galston and Sunstein 
suggest that people with destabilization rights will regularly invoke 
them to preserve existing systems of domination. 82 For me, however, 
the point of destabilization rights comes home when people do not 
exercise them. Then their social institutions are truly theirs. 83 Like 
the programs of traditional social democratic parties, Unger's scheme 
provides a thick left program associated with an argument about 
human nature, although he differs from social democracy in his claims 
about what constitutes human nature. 
I have argued that the antiessentialist and neopragmatist positions, 
79. Galston, supra note 72, at 762. 
80. The complexities of "deciding" not to dissolve a marriage are carefully discussed in 
Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 
MICH. L. REv. l (1991). I merely note the difficulty of spelling out the way in which indissoluble 
marriage promotes intimacy and personal growth for battered wives. 
81. I mean the plural seriously -here. My guess is that Galston is misled by an image of an 
indissoluble marriage where the cost of physical or emotional exit is quite high, compared to one 
where that cost is relatively low. In both, I believe, the opportunities for intimacy and growth 
are opened up by the risk of exit. In the former, the costs of exit create two populations within 
preexisting marriages: those who stay in a lifeless marriage and those who seize the opportuni· 
ties. In the latter, there are again two populations: those who leave and those who seize the 
opportunities. The first group involves "failed" marriages, while the second, I suspect, looks as if 
it involves untroubled marriages. If so, the opportunities for intimacy and growth would appear 
to arise only where the cost of exit was relatively high. 
82. See Sunstein, supra note 74, at 890 ("If the fundamental structure is subject to revision, 
the system may dissolve into one of factionalism and impasse with no questions, fundamental or 
not, capable of resolution."). 
83. Unger is a utopian thinker, and I do not take to be a serious objection to his work that it 
is implausible to believe that if we immediately put in place his scheme, including its destabiliza-
tion rights, we would discover that people were invoking their destabilization rights willy-nilly. 
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when combined with leftist commitments, lead by a complex route 
back to the project of comprehensive normative rationality. Social 
and empowered democracy, premised from the start on a theory of 
human nature, never departed from that project. Are there other 
alternatives? 
IV. CONCLUSION: ALTERNATIVES TO LEFr ANTINORMATIVITY 
Responding to the criticisms leveled against the critique of norma-
tivity by Radin and Michelman, Richard Delgado points out that 
"[t]here is nothing self-contradictory about using a tool to dismantle a 
structure and then using a different tool to build a better one."84 Del-
gado, for example, has been an active proponent of the emerging 
school of narrative jurisprudence, 85 which replaces the standard forms 
in which comprehensive normative rational discourse have tradition-
ally occurred with forms of discourse traditionally associated with im-
aginative literature. The claims made for narrative jurisprudence are 
exciting, and some of the articles in that school are among the most 
stimulating recently published. 86 Narrative jurisprudence offers the 
forms of imaginative literature as a way of tapping or mobilizing "sen-
timental" or "emotional" inclinations. 87 Its project, seen in the terms 
I have been using, would be to reconstitute sentiment and emotion as 
the basis for left politics. Yet structural barriers lead me not to expect 
too much from narrative jurisprudence. In particular, the motiva-
tional and screening mechanisms that create the legal academy are un-
likely to produce many legal academics who are particularly 
noteworthy writers of imaginative literature. 88 The mechanisms, that 
84. Richard Delgado, Moves, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1071, 1073 (1991). 
85. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Na"a-
tive, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411 (1989). 
86. Although, in my querulous mode, I sometimes wonder whether the rate at which the 
work is exciting is higher than the rate at which work associated with comprehensive normative 
rationality is exciting (particularly when one discounts for the fact that young scholars, of whom 
more seem to be associated with narrative jurisprudence, tend to do more exciting work than 
older ones). 
87. The scare quotes are needed to signal that narrative jurisprudence, in this mode at least, 
denies that the distinction between "reason" and "emotion" or "sentiment" is coherent. 
88. For a more particularized discussion, see Mark Tushnet, The Degradation of Constitu-
tional Discourse, 81 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 1992). Duncan Kennedy early remarked on the 
widespread fantasy among successful law students, feeling the strains of legal education, that 
they could be terrific authors of imaginative literature. Duncan Kennedy, How the Law School 
Fails: A Polemic, 1 YALE REv. L. & Soc. ACTION 71, 77 (1970). Kennedy argued that this 
fantasy expressed the private side of a psychological split in which the public side was expressed 
through the law student's "legal" work. Narrative jurisprudence might be seen as an attempt to 
overcome this split. Mark Kelman of Stanford Law School is the author of a commercially 
unsuccessful novel; there may be some law professors or former law professors who have suc-
ceeded as authors of imaginative literature, but surely not more than a handful. In light of 
Kennedy's observations, perhaps we ought to understand narrative jurisprudence as a means by 
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is, are likely to make law professors systematically better at compre-
hensive normative rationality than at narrative jurisprudence. 
Pierre Schlag hints at a different way of understanding the thin 
normativity of the left critique of normativity. He criticizes Martha 
Minow and Elizabeth Spelman, whom he calls "neo-pragmatists," for 
failing to "explor[e] the context of academic legal thought or law re-
view writing or conference papers," and asks that we consider "the 
scene of the writing."89 I have treated the left critique of normativity 
as an intervention in normative discourse, but there is an obvious al-
ternative characterization: It is a series of law review articles, subject 
to the constraints of the form and located in a particular historical and 
disciplinary context. 
Schlag, Delgado, and Winter clearly understand the pull of norma-
tivity in law review articles, and whether consciously or unconsciously 
they may have succumbed to that pull in their thin normative state-
ments. 90 More interesting, perhaps, is the possibility that we could 
understand the left critique of normativity by considering its primary 
audience. Treating these works as performances, I believe that their 
primary audience is other left legal academics, who accept descriptions 
like beggars and torture without considering the implications of that 
acceptance. And in the circumstances of their production, the articles 
might be political interventions, aimed at shoring up confidence 
among left legal academics at a time when their project seems un-
promising in the arena of politics and unsustainable in the arena of 
intellectual discourse. The message is, "Don't worry, you can be a left 
legal academic anyway." The thin left commitments expressed in the 
articles would serve to identify the audience and defuse concern that 
the intellectual project outlined by the critique of normativity could 
support right-wing commitments just as readily as it does left-wing 
ones.91 
To use Delgado's terms, though, one might find another tool for 
rebuilding normative discourse. It is to relinquish any normative 
which people can do what they really want to do in the field into which circumstances have led 
them. 
89. Schlag, supra note S, at 889. 
90. I should note that one dimension of this pull is the desire on the part of student law 
review editors for articles that contain normative statements. I wonder whether the editors of the 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review would have accepted the symposium on which I have 
focused had it been relentlessly nonnormative. 
91. Another reading of these articles is that they are strategically designed to push their 
audience away from normativity - even small-scale normativity - entirely, but that their au-
thors understand that the audience is as yet too committed to making normative judgments to be 
moved by articles unless they demonstrate some modest normative commitments. 
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claims for leftist inclinations.92 Left legal scholarship would be exclu-
sively critical, deconstructing the normative claims made elsewhere in 
legal scholarship but offering nothing at all in their place. This pro-
ject, too, seems difficult to sustain. Left legal academics walk into 
classrooms every day in which students demand that we say what our 
views are on controverted issues. A stance of unremitting critique will 
not satisfy them. To face such dissatisfaction routinely is simply un-
comfortable. Thus, even a leftist teacher committed to "only critique" 
is likely to succumb in the classroom.93 Because the classroom is 
where we try out many of our ideas, it seems likely that the normativ-
ity to which this teacher is pushed in the classroom will come to infect 
his or her scholarship. 
There is, of course, an alternative. Perhaps the critique of norma-
tivity goes all the way down, in which case the "only critique" stance 
is the only one an intellectually honest legal academic can take. But 
perhaps the critique of normativity is wrong. Legal academics might 
then remain committed to the project of comprehensive normative ra-
tionality, and their modest normative gestures would be promissory 
notes to be cashed in elsewhere, in the development of a comprehen-
sive normative theory.94 
92. I am committed to using this tool, though I acknowledge the difficulty of doing so. See 
TUSHNET, supra note 15, at 318 ("Critique is all there is."). 
93. In addition, the purely critical stance may well be quite unsettling to left-liberal students, 
whom leftist teachers want to encourage. To satisfy that segment of our audience, which we 
regard as especially important, we may be compelled to inject normativity into the classroom. 
94. Andrew Altman has suggested to me the alternative of a division of labor, in which law 
professors would develop small-scale leftist reforms and would leave to philosophers the task of 
justifying leftism more comprehensively (leaving open the possibility, Altman points out, that in 
the end the theorists will demonstrate that leftism "won't wash"). Altman's comments suggest 
that the leftist critique of normativity might best be understood as yet another version of the 
familiar "lawyer as astrophysicist" problem. See Mark Tushnet, Truth, Justice, and the Ameri-
can Way: An Interpretation of Public Law in the Seventies, 51 TEXAS L. R.Ev. 1307 (1979) 
(describing law professors' confidence that they can perform at high professional level in any field 
to which they direct their attention). 
